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Abstract For decades, racial profiling has been subject of intense debate in US
jurisdiction. Recently, outcome tests based on economic models have contributed to
the legal discourse. However, it is not readily obvious if and to what extent they also
pertain to European jurisdiction, where racial profiling has only as of late stirred up
controversy. In a comprehensive examination of their basic building blocks, this
paper illustrates why the these tests are not particularly suited for the European case.
The models are tailored to identify racial prejudice but are unfit to provide evidence
of statistical discrimination, reflecting their adaption to the current US legal
approach. A simple alternative test remedies this shortcoming and manages to
inform the European jurisdiction.
Keywords Racial profiling  Outcome test  Discrimination  Europe
JEL Classification J71  K42
1 Introduction
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 2001, racial profiling, a
controversial policing practice that had hitherto been predominantly subject of
debate in the US, began to gain ground in Europe. Racial profiling describes the use
of ethnicity or race as one of the criteria of law enforcement officers in deciding
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whether to (preemptively) stop or search suspects. This method was overtly
suggested even by leading figures after the subsequent terrorist attacks in Europe.
As Ian Johnston, the Chief Constable of British Transport Police put it after the
attacks in London in July 2005: ‘‘We should not waste time searching old white
ladies. It is going to be disproportionate. It is going to be young men, not
exclusively, but it may be disproportionate when it comes to ethnic groups.’’ (Dodd
2005) The introduction of racial profiling in Europe has stirred up major public
controversy but, in contrast to the US, it has not yet been extensively discussed in
the judicial realm (Baker 2007).
Assessing the motivation behind racial profiling gives rise to intricate issues.
Some critics argue that the discretionary nature of police searches gives leeway for
prejudice and thus racial animus, enabling racist officers to indulge in their
malevolent preferences. This argument goes beyond the mere consideration of
ethnicity in the decision-making process. To a racist officer, searching individuals of
a despised ethnicity is an end to itself. In contrast, the potential consideration of
suspect ethnicity by an unprejudiced officer would serve as means to optimizing the
odds of catching actual perpetrators, notably the proclaimed goal of any form of
profiling. Both varieties of discrimination—known in the economic literature as
taste-based and statistical, respectively—burden the affected ethnicities with a
greater likelihood for stop or search because of their ethnicity. Yet a greater
likelihood in the empirical data does not imply that ethnicity played a role in the
profile. For it is possible that ethnicity merely correlates with other observable
characteristics indicative of criminal intent. A policy that bases its search decisions
solely on these characteristics will nevertheless end up having a disparate impact in
form of differing stop or search rates. This poses a problem in the interpretation of
empirical outcome data with respect to the underlying motive. All three
explanations—animus, efficiency, and correlation—are consistent with dispropor-
tionate impact. The cause of the disparity, however, is not readily obvious from the
available data.
Disentangling the motives is of high importance from a legal standpoint. The US
and European jurisdictions differ substantially in their understanding of justified
discrimination in police searches. In the US, discrimination law has no issues with
disparate impact. Instead, the plaintiff has to establish an intent to discriminate,
which is defined as prejudice that serves no policing purpose (Persico and Todd
2008). In Europe, on the other hand, proving mere disparate impact is sufficient for
a case to hold up in court (Baker and Phillipson 2011). A judge applying European
law as defined in the European Convention on Human Rights does not require
evidence of malevolent intention to establish unlawful policing. Even so, the motive
and hence actual cause behind an outcome disparity is also significant in European
jurisdiction for it weighs up matters of proportionality; the question whether the
disparate impact can be traded off in light of a compelling state interest.
What has economics to say about the causes of disparate impacts? Two
methodologically distinct branches have evolved in the literature to infer motives
from empirical outcome data. The first branch deals purely statistically with the
question whether police officers treat similarly suspicious individuals differently
because of their ethnicity. Typically, a multiple regression conditions the dependent
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variable (say, the probability of a search) to a list of independent variables that are
potentially informative of engagement in criminal activity (such as behavior,
location, or demeanor of the suspect). The difficulty that arises from this approach is
that ex post, the researcher rarely gains insight into all the variables that make up the
suspicion signal. This classic statistical difficulty is known as the omitted variables
problem. Even if one had access to all this information, it is arguable whether it can
be quantified appropriately for statistical inference.
The second, more recent branch of the racial profiling literature circumvents
these problems by tackling the question from the other end. In focusing on the
outcome of the decision-making, a researcher can make inferences about the level of
‘‘probable cause’’ that the decision-maker has required during the prior assessment.
For instance, if searches against minority groups yield lower success rates than
against other groups, one would deduce that the police unjustifiably apply a lower
threshold of suspicion when deciding to search minorities. Crucially, the omitted
variables problem does not arise in this analysis. All the relevant variables were
already taken into account by the decision-maker. This information is reflected in a
single statistic: the outcome. If the decision-maker only cares about efficiency and
thus aims for the optimal outcome, there should be no disparities along ethnicity or
gender in the outcome data. This method of inferring prejudice is appropriately
called an outcome test.
In the context of racial profiling, modeled adaptions of outcome tests to
determine police prejudice in motor vehicle searches have emerged in the US during
the last decade. They have become increasingly popular in the economics literature
and are of practical relevance for the judicial realm (Knowles et al. 2001; Anwar
and Fang 2006). The theoretical foundations of these modeled outcome tests address
some of the drawbacks of the traditional outcome test application. Obviously, the
models have been adapted to the specific context of the US law. In particular, they
are apt at distinguishing racial bias (the illicit intent to discriminate) from legal
statistical discrimination. While disentangling these two motives is valuable to the
European jurisdiction as well, it is not clear what the models have to say about the
existence of statistical discrimination itself. However, in European jurisdiction it is
central know whether any disparate impact is the cause of deliberate statistical
discrimination or whether it originates from a race-neutral policy. This difference
affects the justification of disparate impact.
The literature on modeled outcome tests has neglected this crucial difference in
European jurisdiction. This paper elaborates on the exact role of statistical
discrimination in the existing models and shows which lessons can be drawn for the
judicial discourse in Europe. The paper makes no contention about the ethical scope
of racial profiling (Risse and Zeckhauser 2004; Lever 2005). It also ignores any
detrimental effects towards social cohesion and stigmatization (Loury and Coate
1993; Loury 2002). Neither will I dwell on questions about the validity of rational
choice assumptions in law and economics or well-known caveats of cognitive bias
in behavioral economics (although rational choice is discussed critically). Instead, I
illustrate why and to what extent the existing literature is relevant for European
racial profiling litigation. I contend that while the existing modeled outcome tests
remain somewhat useful for the European approach, they are not suitable to address
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proportionality and thus the justification of disparate impact. I conclude by
proposing a simple alternative way to answer this question.
The paper proceeds with a theoretically based motivation for the emergence of
(modeled) outcome tests and starts with a brief introduction to the basic building
blocks of the economics of discrimination. These theoretical foundations are
described in the next section. Section 3 builds on this formal basis and exposits the
two dominant economic models on prejudice in motor vehicle searches. A particular
focus is given to the role of rational choice and statistical discrimination. Section 4
lays out the central differences in the US and the European jurisdiction on racial
profiling and highlights the role of the models for Europe. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical foundations of the outcome test
Economic theory distinguishes between two forms of discrimination. Taste-based
discrimination corresponds to malevolent intent, unjustified prejudice so to speak.
This form of discrimination is an end to itself as the discriminating behavior
provides actual utility to the offender. Statistical discrimination, on the other hand,
denotes the instrumental use of race (or, say, gender). If race improves an
assessment of some form of productivity, statistical discrimination contends that
rational and unprejudiced decision-makers should take group affiliation into
account. This section briefly outlines the theories of taste-based and statistical
discrimination and explains how outcome tests incorporate both notions.
2.1 Taste-based discrimination
The economic study of malevolent discrimination has its roots in the works of
Becker (1957). In his model, discrimination is part of an individual’s utility
function. Following Altonji and Blank (1999), Becker splits his analysis into three
parts: employer discrimination, employee discrimination, and consumer discrimi-
nation. To get an idea of the basic principle, it suffices to present a very general
formulation of the model. The key aspect in Becker’s framework is the proposition
that a so-called ‘‘taste for discrimination’’ directly affects the utility in case of
association with the group against which the taste is directed. For instance, an
employer suffers a loss of utility by employing some person X, an employee suffers
a loss of utility by having to work with person X, or consumers experience a utility
loss when buying from person X. This proposition extends the traditional profit or
utility function. In the employer-employee example, the employer—or rather, the
firm—maximizes the following function:
U ¼ pFðNw þ NbÞ  xwNw  xbNb  dNb
Note that in contrast to conventional profit maximizing behavior, firms are assumed
to maximize utility. The production function is given by F and the exogenous price
level is given by p. Nr with r 2 ðw; bÞ denotes the number of employed white
(w) and black (b) workers at wages xr, respectively. So far, these terms coincide
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with a conventional profit function. Discrimination against black workers extends
this function and operates through the coefficient d [ 0. This so-called discrimi-
nation coefficient measures the cost of employing Nb black workers.
Discriminating firms may differ in their intensity of discrimination, such that d is
distributed according to the cumulative density function G with mean d. The firms’
malevolent preferences increase the price of hiring a black worker to xb ? d.
In essence, a discriminating firm behaves as if the wage of a black worker was
xb ? d. Thus, a firm will only hire black workers if their price is low enough in
comparison to white workers. A firm maximizes its utility by setting the marginal
value of a worker equal to his or her marginal cost.
What determines the observed wage gap in the market? One might be inclined
to think that d, the average degree of discrimination among the firms, determines
the market wage of black workers. Instead, it turns out that the marginal firm
which is indifferent between hiring a white or black worker is decisive for the
wage gap. Market wages for black workers are determined by the firm with the
highest taste for discrimination among the firms that are willing to employ black
workers. Note that all firms with d lower than the marginal firm are at an
advantage, while all firms above the marginal firm would make a loss from
employing blacks.
Becker’s model predicts the eradication of discrimination in many market
settings through the force of competition. So ironically, the model ‘‘predicts the
absence of the phenomenon it was designed to explain’’ (Arrow 1972, p. 192). But
tastes alone seem to be unable to explain ongoing observable differences in central
economic variables along race and gender. While US data do show some
convergence in the decades after the legal ban of overt discrimination with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, empirical evidence also suggests that the trends stagnated in the
1980s and 1990s. Moreover, even today taste-based discrimination is seemingly
present in expensive markets such as car sales and housing (Yinger 1998). This
indicates that competitive pressure on its own is not likely to equalize differences in
market outcome. Against this backdrop, in the 1970s models of imperfect
information extended the economic theory of discrimination. The next subsection
exposits the basic principles of statistical discrimination.
Two basic principles of the taste-based framework are still reflected in today’s
models. First, racial animus affects the utility of the discriminating individual.
Costly association is one representation of this effect. Other approaches model a
benefit from discrimination, deriving from the mistreatment of despised groups.
Second, the cause of disparate impact should be evaluated at the margin, not on
average. In Becker’s model, it is the marginal prejudiced firm, and not the average
one, that determines the level of disparate outcome in the market.
2.2 Statistical discrimination
The seminal work by Phelps (1972) reshaped the economic analysis of discrim-
ination. Instead of harboring malevolent tastes, decision-makers use race or gender
as a signal to improve an assessment under uncertainty. Phelps takes the example of
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noisy signals of productivity that are transmitted from employees (agents) to
employers (principals). The optimal solution to this signal extraction problem is
statistical discrimination. This form of discrimination can explain inequalities in
outcomes in the absence of prejudice. In what follows, I briefly discuss the statistical
discrimination models laid out in Aigner and Cain (1977).
Assume that there are agents with a true skill level q which principals can only
observe indirectly via an indicator y, some form of aptitude test. While the indicator
measures the true skill level on average, there is uncertainty in the assessment
because the relationship is diluted with an error term:
y ¼ q þ u
The distribution of the error term u is i.i.d. and follows N 0; r2u
 
. The true skill
level q is i.i.d. according to N a; r2q
 
. These distributions are public information.
Principals are interested in an estimator of q given y. They do best to form an
‘‘educated guess’’ based on all the available information. The expectation bq is
formally given by
bq ¼ E qjyð Þ ¼ 1  bð Þa þ by: ð1Þ
The expectation of the true skill level is the weighted sum of a group term (with an
average true skill level a) and an individual term (with an indicator level y). The
parameter b scales the individual signal y . A high b means that the signal is a good
indicator of the true skill level.
In the simple job market environment described in Aigner and Cain, the
expectation of the true skill level bq is assumed to be directly linked to the agent’s
wage. Equation (1) states that bq is a function of y. In particular, the expectation of
the true skill level bq depends on (a) the average skill level a, (b) the variance of the
true skill level q, and (c) the variance of the error term u which dilutes the individual
signal. These two variances enter Eq. 1 through b, which is defined as:
b ¼ r
2
q
r2q þ r2u
ð2Þ
Equation (2) illustrates to what extent information about the group affects
optimal inference of individual signals. Consider two groups of workers, black and
white, which differ only in their variance of true skills, rq
2. Assume that the true
skills among black workers vary more than among white ones. The average skill as
well as the extraction quality via the indicator y is equal for both black and white
workers. It then follows from Eq. (2) that b is higher for black workers. In other
words, the indicator y is a more reliable signal of the true skill for black workers if
true skill varies more in their population.
What does this entail for the wages paid by the employers? In an unprejudiced
environment, all workers are paid based on their expected skill level. Any worker
with an indicator that coincides with the average of the true skill a is going to earn
exactly according to his or her true skill. However, black workers with indicators
above a are paid more than white workers with equal indicators. Because y is a more
reliable signal for the true skill of black workers, employers can be quite confident
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that black workers with an above average indicator are actually better than white
workers with the same indicator. On the other hand, below average indicators
y result in lower wages for black workers because employers infer that they are
more likely to have less skills.
In this example, we will find relatively lower wages for black workers in low
productivity jobs and relatively higher wages for black workers in high productivity
jobs. If we flip the situation and assume the indicator of white workers to be more
informative about their true skill, we would observe the opposite. So in the absence
of prejudice, the Phelps model can explain unequal compensation for black and
white workers with the same indicator y.
Differences in average group abilities also give rise to unequal compensation of
workers with equal indicators y. Assume that both the variances of the true skill
levels and the error terms are equal for black and white workers. The quality of the
predictor as reflected by b is therefore equivalent. Now let the average true skill a be
higher for white workers. In this setting, black workers consistently earn a fixed
amount less than white workers at every indicator level y.
Statistical discrimination is a indispensable ingredient in modern economic
models of discrimination (for a comprehensive survey, see Fang and Moro 2011).
The models have become increasingly sophisticated, but the basic principle of
optimal signal extraction remains: If individual signals are imperfect, observable
group affiliation can be useful to improve the principal’s assessment.
2.3 Outcome tests
Outcome tests are an established alternative to traditional statistical analyses to
identify taste-based discrimination in the marketplace. The method relies on the
premises that animus is costly and that decision-makers make full use of available
information. In other words, the method draws from the principles of taste-based
and statistical discrimination. Fittingly, it was Becker (1993) who made this idea
popular. Becker insinuated that prejudiced banks could be identified by comparing
mortgage default rates of black and white customers.
To illustrate, let a bank rank their mortgage applicants by ascending credit
ratings, starting with the ones that are most likely to default. The bank chooses a
certain threshold of creditworthiness above which it deems the risk of default low
enough. Only applicants above the threshold are granted a mortgage. If the bank
applies the same standard to both black and white applicants, the outcome test
claims that the probabilities of default should be equal. The rejection of relatively
good risks results in lower average default rates. So if black lenders display a lower
default rate, the bank is concluded to have intentionally applied a more stringent
credit standard and therefore to be racially prejudiced. In a nutshell, outcome tests
infer if a principal requires better outcomes for certain groups when making a
decision.
Outcome tests can be applied to a myriad of settings in which a principal demands
productive outcomes from an agent. The existing literature covers subjects such as
lending decisions, bail bond settings, paper citation rates, organ transplantation, and,
of course, police searches. I briefly discuss the underlying ideas in turn.
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Bail bonds create incentives for suspects to appear in court for an upcoming trial.
The price of the bail bond is set by the judge, who weighs up the benefit of the
suspect not having to stay incarcerated against the risk of the suspect not appearing
for trial. If black suspects appear more frequently for given bail bond prices, the
judge is assumed to have set the bail too high because of prejudice. Ayres and
Waldfogel (1994) analyze appearance rates for a sample of US trials and conclude
an unjustifiably higher standard required from black suspects.
Smart et al. (1996) test whether publications of female authors in refereed
economic journals display deviating citation rates. If their papers yield higher
citation rates, female authors would seem to have satisfied tougher requirements
from referees and editors. The study finds no gender bias.
Health economics also provides fertile ground for the application of outcome
tests. Ayres (2005) argues that if minorities end up having longer survival times
after a kidney transplantation, they must have unjustifiably satisfied higher standards
of health prospect in order to receive the transplant.
Finally, Ayres (2001, 2002) describes the use of outcome tests to identify racial
prejudice in motor vehicle searches. Knowles et al. (2001) put forth an according
model which gives rise to testable predictions. In an nutshell, in their model the
police are deemed unprejudiced if the probabilities of a successful search do not
differ between black and white motorists. On the other hand, if black motorists were
victims of taste based discrimination, the police would apply a lower suspicion
threshold when deciding whether to search them. This would yield a lower
probability of uncovering engagement in criminal activity among black drivers.
Anwar and Fang (2006) address some drawbacks of the model and present an
alternative test. For reasons I will discuss in a bit, both these outcome tests for racial
prejudice in motor vehicle searches are based on models with specific economic
assumptions. The models are exposited in Sect. 4.
The advantage of the outcome test is that it is not susceptible to omitted variable
bias. This bias can occur if the statistician has less information available than the
decision-maker. Consider a potential race or gender bias against applicants during
job interviews. To identify this bias by traditional regression analysis, data are
gathered ex post to calculate the likelihood of getting a job depending on the
applicant’s characteristics. For the sake of the argument, let us assume that
applicants from Harvard are particularly apt for the job in question, and the
employer knows this. Let ‘‘Harvard graduate’’ be a feature that occurs with higher
propensity among white males. If this information is not available to the researcher,
one could be mistakenly be lead to believe that white males receive preferential
treatment. Outcome tests avoid such confoundings. Because the decision-maker has
plausibly considered any variable that affects the desired outcome, the statistician
has indirectly full access to all this information via the outcome data.
To sum up, an unbiased employer should only care about productivity. If ex post,
there is an observable difference in productivity along race or gender, the employer
required a higher quality from the discriminated group. In terms of Becker’s model,
the quality gap is a measure of the employer’s malignant utility. This preference can
be modeled in various ways. One can argue that employers suffer utility losses from
giving jobs to applicants they feel contempt for. At some point however, the
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productivity of a highly qualified minority applicant begins to make up for these
costs such that the employers cannot afford to decline jobs to all minorities. An
alternative modeling of discriminatory preference is more sadistic: A malevolent
employer might actually enjoy treating the disadvantaged group unfairly. Whatever
the reason, an unfair decision will lead to differences in productivity ex post. In
addition to this utility concept, outcome tests rely on the premise of statistical
discrimination. The principal is assumed to make best use of all available
information. If group affiliation improves the assessment, it will be taken into
account.
2.4 Drawbacks of outcome tests
In light of limited information, outcome tests seem like an intriguing approach to
assess the motives behind a decision-making. However, the method has its
drawbacks. There are two main issues. The first one relates to the identification of
statistical discrimination and pertains directly to the significance of outcome tests in
European jurisdiction. The second issue is known as infra-marginality and questions
the applicability of the test under certain conditions. Let us first discuss the role of
statistical discrimination.
Outcome tests assume that all the information on which the principals base their
decisions is fully exploited in terms of efficiency. This is a crucial assumption. It
means that any applicant signal that improves the assessment of the productivity is
taken into account. Section 2.2 has shown that group affiliation is of potential use
when making an educated guess and forming expectations based on noisy signals.
So when faced with uncertainty, in outcome tests the principal is bound to
discriminate statistically if visible group affiliation is useful. More precisely, if the
principal was able to improve the assessment by incorporating statistical discrim-
ination, outcome tests implicitly require him to have done so by assumption. From a
rational point of view, this assumption does not seem not so far-fetched. If an
unbiased principal realizes group differences in desirable outcomes, she will update
her assessment in light of the costly consequences of her decisions. The use of
statistical discrimination avoids losing good risks.
But this assumption becomes a practical issue when statistical discrimination is
not applicable. Assume that the researcher ex post has access to some information
that the principal did not have. If this information had improved the productivity
assessment, outcome tests can lead to false conclusions, in particular when
observability for the principal changes. Table 1 adapts an example from Persico
(2009) which describes drug trafficking and police searches. For now, assume that
Table 1 Observability
constraints in outcome tests
Black motorist White motorist
Red car 50 %/50 50 %/50
Blue car 0 %/70 60 %/70
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there is a homogenous distribution of criminal likelihood for each category. The
argument readily extends to heterogeneous distributions that invoke suspicion
thresholds.
Consider a police officer who has no taste for discrimination but wants to
maximize the probability of uncovering criminal engagement during a motor
vehicle search. The officer has a budget of 100 searches. Two characteristics affect
the allocation of the searches: the color of the cars, and potentially motorist race.
Table 1 shows the known and exogenous probabilities of criminal activity for each
car color/motorist race combination as well as their absolute frequencies.
In a first step, let statistical discrimination by race not be applicable, either
because the race of the motorist is not visible or simply illicit in the search profile.
Car color, on the other hand, can always be exploited for inference. In this case, the
officer does best to search red cars only. In contrast to searching blue cars, this
yields 50 hits compared to 42. Both the search success rates against black and white
motorists are 50 %. A researcher conducting an outcome test on motorist race would
therefore conclude the absence of racial animus.
If however the race of the motorist can be taken into account to improve the
assessment, the officer would search all white motorists driving a blue car and
devote the rest of the budget to motorists driving red cars, no matter black or white.
This strategy yields 57 hits. If the 30 searches against red cars are randomly
distributed between black and white motorists, we expect 15 of each to be searched
on average. An outcome test on motorist race now concludes racial animus: The
search success rate against black motorists is 7.5/15 = 50 %, whereas white
motorists are searched successfully at a rate of (7.5 ? 42)/(15 ? 70) = 58.24 %.
The color-blind case in the example highlights that an outcome test for prejudice
might not be applicable if the researcher has access to more information than the
principal. More specifically, when statistical discrimination was not employed
despite its potential to improve the assessment, outcome tests based on these very
characteristics can be misleading. By the same token, outcome tests are not
applicable when statistical discrimination is used reluctantly or is forbidden by law.
Ayres (2005) makes a similar argument in the case of kidney transplants. The
effectiveness of a mandated color-blind or gender-neutral policy to eliminate
prejudice can therefore not be assessed with outcome tests. The example also
stresses that in general, animus cannot be concluded from changes in treatment if
the characteristic in question becomes observable. For example, a rise in job offers
to female musicians after the introduction of blind auditions has to be interpreted
carefully (Persico 2009). Changes in treatment could be triggered by statistical
discrimination.
The second issue associated with outcome tests is dubbed the infra-marginality
problem. Outcome tests usually assess average outcome data. But conclusive
inferences about the principal’s motives need to be assessed at the margin. Yinger
(1996) explains the problem in the mortgage context as follows.
Assume that banks rank their mortgage applicants by creditworthiness. All
applicants must fulfill a certain degree of some objective merit criteria. The
applicant who just qualifies for a mortgage is the marginal applicant. If the bank is
unbiased, the probabilities of default of the marginal black and white applicants are
280 Eur J Law Econ (2013) 36:271–294
123
equal. However, the distribution of the probabilities of the good risks above the
threshold are not necessarily equal. Consequently, the average default rates among
the ones that make the cut will typically differ and are not indicative of marginal
decision-making.
Heckman (1998) describes a vivid sports analogy for this inference problem.
Consider black and white high jumpers who have the same athletic ability to jump
but use different techniques. Although the mean height they achieve is equal, the
variance in heights is lower in the population of white jumpers. In other words,
black jumpers are more likely to reach both lower and higher heights. Unbiased
treatment implies that the bar is set at the same height for everyone. But if the bar is
set rather high, relatively more black jumpers will excel. On the other hand, if the
bar is set fairly low, black jumpers will be more likely to fail than white jumpers.
The example goes to show that differences in average failure rates cannot be
ascribed to unfair treatment if the groups do not share the same qualification pool.
Indeed, an outcome test could mistakenly indicate the absence of racial bias when in
fact it is present. Worse still, an outcome test could mistakenly indicate racial bias
against the actually privileged group. Infra-marginality, then, poses a serious
problem for the applicability of outcome tests. If there is no good reason to assume
that the different groups share the same quality distribution, average outcome data is
of limited use for the inference of animus.
The infra-marginality problem translates to the context of motor vehicle searches.
In general, racial animus cannot be ruled out on the basis of equal average search
success rates. To illustrate, line up all motorists according to their probability of
carrying contraband, based on a police officer’s perception. Consider an unbiased
officer that will only search motorists that are above a specific probability of guilt
threshold that applies to both black and white motorists. If the distributions with
respect to these probabilities differ such that black motorists above the threshold
are, on average, less likely to be guilty, the outcome test will falsely conclude racial
animus. And to put the above generic pitfall into context, an outcome test might
even indicate racial bias against white motorists when in reality the officer is biased
and demands less scrutiny from black motorists.
Motor vehicle searches depict situations with dichotomous outcomes. The police
are either successful or not. Mortgage applications follow the same pattern.
Applicants either default or not. However, infra-marginality is less of a problem in a
non-dichotomous setting. Take the examples of article citations or bail bonds.
Articles receive a countable number of citations and bail bonds are set at a specific
amount for each case. In both settings, the according distributions can be assessed
more closely and marginal decision-making becomes more apparent due to the
particular outcome for each entity.
To round up, outcome tests rely on two crucial assumptions. First, the decision-
maker is assumed to make use of statistical discrimination if it improves the
assessment. The inferences based on outcome tests have nothing to say about
whether statistical discrimination was actually applied during the decision-making.
Either way, observable differences in outcomes are attributable to non-productive
motives, namely animus (which is traded off for productivity). Conversely, this
implies that if beneficial statistical discrimination was not applicable during the
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decision-making, outcome tests are not informative of animus. The second crucial
assumption outcome tests rely on is that they require the groups in question to share
the same pool of qualities. Inference based on average outcome data is thus not
appropriate if the groups display differing distributions of outcome-relevant
qualities.
Economic theory rarely has issues with the first assumption. On the contrary, full
use of available information is embedded in the modeling core of classic economic
behavior. The second assumption raises an application problem, however. This
explains the recent rise of modeled outcome tests which are built to tackle infra-
marginality in effort to provide eligible inferences. On that note, Anwar and Fang
(2013) study bounceback rates of emergency room visits to assess racial prejudice in
health care. Alesina and La Ferrara (2011) provide a rank order test for racial
prejudice based on judicial errors in lower courts. Anwar and Fang (2012) model the
decision problem of a parole board and put forth a test for racial prejudice in parole
decisions. Finally, since September 2001 airport searches have become subject of
heated debates. Persico and Todd (2005) show the trade-offs involved in a model of
passenger profiling.
To assess racial prejudice in motor vehicle searches, Knowles et al. (2001)
(henceforth KPT) put forth a seminal model that relies on rational choice on the part
of both the motorists and the police. A subsequent model by Anwar and Fang (2006)
relaxes the assumption of rational choice and instead exploits data on officer race.
The next section exposits how both models address infra-marginality and highlights
the role of taste-based and statistical discrimination.1 The analysis will make clear
why the testable implications of the models remain of limited use for racial profiling
litigation under European jurisdiction.
3 Two models of racial profiling in motor vehicle searches
3.1 Rational choice: the KPT framework
There is a continuum of homogenous police officers controlling motorists with
observable race r 2 B; Wf g. The police aims to uncover engagement in criminal
activity, say, motorists carrying contraband. Let c be a one-dimensional variable—
partially or fully unobservable by the statistician—which combines all variables
other than race that affect an officer’s search decision. The cumulative distributions
of c among black and white motorists are given by F cjBð Þ and F cjWð Þ. Police
officers maximize the probability of finding contraband minus their search cost. The
benefit of an arrest is one and the marginal cost of searching an rm motorist is
tr 2 0; 1ð Þ. Officers are said to exhibit a taste for discrimination if these costs depend
on the race of the motorist. A successful search, i.e. finding contraband, is indicated
by the event G. For simplicity, assume that guilty motorists are always uncovered if
they undergo a search.
1 Some passages in Sect. 3 and, to a lesser extent, Sect. 4 recapitulate the descriptions in Ilic´ (2013).
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In this game, police officers make a decision whether to search based on the
observable information (c, r). Motorists, on the other hand, decide whether to carry
contraband. Consider first the motorist’s decision. The search probability is the only
endogenous factor in the decision whether to carry contraband.2 Should they decide
not to carry contraband, their payoff is zero regardless of being searched or not.
Should they decide to carry, their payoff is -j(c, r) \ 0 if they are searched and
thus uncovered. If they get away with carrying contraband, their benefit amounts to
v(c, r)[0. The search probability of a motorist of type (c, r) is denoted by c c; rð Þ.
Taking all this into account, the expected payoff of the motorist becomes
c c; rð Þ j c; rð Þf g þ 1  c c; rð Þf gv c; rð Þ:
Carrying contraband is profitable if the expected payoff from doing so is positive.
Conversely, the motorist does not carry contraband if the expected payoff is
negative.
Now turn to the decision problem of the police. Based on the guilt probability
P Gjc; rð Þ the officer decides at what rate to search each motorist group. Police
officers maximize their payoff by setting their search rates c c; rð Þ as to maximize
max
c c;Wð Þ;c c;Bð Þ
X
r¼W ;B
P Gjc; rð Þ  trf gc c; rð Þf cjrð Þdc:
If the term inside the curly brackets—the officer’s benefit of a successful search
minus the search cost—is greater than zero, the officer will search the according
type (c, r) with probability one (and vice versa).
The situation implies a mixed Nash equilibrium in which both motorists and
police officers randomize their strategies. The indifference condition for the
motorist yields the equilibrium search intensity
c c; rð Þ ¼ v c; rð Þ
v c; rð Þ þ j c; rð Þ ð3Þ
The indifference condition for the police officers determines the guilt probability (or
search success rate)
P Gjc; rð Þ ¼ tr; 8c; r
if the police officers do not exhibit a taste for discrimination. Thus, in an unprej-
udiced equilibrium, black and white motorists carry contraband with equal proba-
bility. If the probabilities between the groups differed, the officers would
(completely) devote themselves to the group with the higher propensity. This in turn
would affect the incentives in the neglected motorist group. A pure search strategy
can therefore not be optimal.
Racial animus is modeled by search costs that depend on motorist race, tB = tW.
This can readily be tested with outcome data. Should the guilt probability (or rather,
the search success rates) of searched motorists vary by race, the police officers trade
off some of the benefit of an arrest with the benefit derived from racial animus.
2 In the economic approach to crime pioneered by Becker (1968), two factors determine the decision of
engaging in criminal activity: Measure of the punishment, and probability of getting caught. Whereas the
former is considered fix in the KPT model, the uncovering probability is determined endogenously.
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In terms of the model, lower search costs against a discriminated group lead to
‘‘oversearching’’. The increased deterrence drives down the search success rate,
precisely the effect that can be empirically tested for.
A central insight of this model is the unbiased explanation for higher search rates
against one group. This happens if either the expected value of carrying contraband
or the cost of being found guilty varies by motorist race. A higher incentive of
carrying contraband moves in lockstep with a stronger deterrence in form of a
higher search rate, dictated by the equilibrium condition of equal search success
rates.
KPT test their model on 1,590 observations of motor vehicle searches on a
highway stretch in Maryland, USA from 1995 to 1999. After the first lawsuit filed
by The American Civil Liberties Union of Maryland in 1993, the police started
collecting systematic information on motor vehicle searches. KPT’s empirical test
compares the search success rates against black and white motorists and cannot
reject equality, suggesting that police officers in the Maryland data do not exhibit
racial animus against black motorists. Their results do however imply that Hispanic
motorists suffer from prejudice.
The KPT model incorporates the two classic economic branches of taste-based
and statistical discrimination discussed in Sect. 2. Willingness to pay for malevolent
tastes is modeled by trading off the benefit of higher search success rates. The lower
payoff from searching the discriminated group is offset by the benefit of
mistreatment. This gap is equivalent to the wage gap between black and white
workers in Becker’s employer discrimination model. The significance of marginal
decision-making is reflected in KPT as well. The system resides in equilibrium
through a marginal trade-off in search success rates. But in contrast to Becker’s
employer discrimination model, racially biased police officers are not driven out of
the market. They bear the foregone profits in terms of lower hit rates themselves in a
non-competitive market.
In addition to taste-based discrimination KPT’s model incorporates the notion of
statistical discrimination. The police observe the individual signal c as well as group
identity r and do best to exploit this information fully. But do we know if the police
actually make use of group identity? For example, assume that in an unbiased
equilibrium black motorists are searched at a higher rate. Does this disparate impact
stem from statistical discrimination? It turns out that the KPT model cannot answer
this question.
On the one hand, it is possible that the police do use motorist race to make
inferences about unobservable characteristics that are correlated with crime. For
example, r might constitute a proxy for crime if lower earnings are associated with a
higher propensity to carry contraband. Assume that the black population earns less
on average. In this case, black motorists with the same observable characteristics
c as white motorists are searched at a higher rate if the proxy carries additional
information indicative of crime (KPT, p. 212). In other words, white motorists get to
send a higher signal of suspicion c before they are deemed suspicious enough to
search. This relates to Aigner and Cain’s classical model of statistical discrimination
in Sect. 2.2, where employers are compensated differently despite the same
productivity indicator.
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On the other hand, the differences in search rates may solely arise from
differences in the distribution of c, the characteristics indicative of crime that the
police actually observe. These distributions might differ by race such that the
individual signals of suspicion prompt the police to search black motorists at a
higher rate. Race then merely correlates with the signals and does nothing to
improve the assessment. In other words, the police ignore race.
The latter explanation does not constitute racial profiling because race is not used
to make inferences about engagement in criminal activity. The first explanation does
fit the definition of racial profiling for optimal signal extraction. However, both
explanations are consistent with higher search rates, and it may be the case that both
explanations apply. The KPT model has nothing to say about the actual cause. The
inability to detect statistical discrimination is a disadvantage of the KPT model, and
unavoidably so because it is based on the general outcome test methodology. In
return, the KPT test inherits the primary advantage of outcome tests and does not
suffer from omitted variable bias. The police officers make use of all observed
information, information that is eventually reflected in the search success rates.
In contrast to the issue of statistical discrimination, the KPT test successfully
deals with the second issue in outcome tests. Like all outcome tests, KPT lends itself
to empirical application because of its modest information requirement. Section 2.4
has shown that traditional outcome tests have problems in interpreting average
outcome data because group distributions in guilt probabilities may differ. The KPT
test, however, is not susceptible to this infra-marginality problem. Because of the
strategic interaction in the model, the (unprejudiced) equilibrium predicts
p(c, r) = tr for all c, so all motorists are equally likely to carry contraband. The
marginal and the average search success rate are one and the same. This feature
renders average outcome data informative and allows for inferences about racial
animus.
The follow-up literature has raised several objections against the KPT model. Let
us first evaluate some that do the model no harm. The equilibrium prediction of all
motorists randomizing on the decision to carry contraband does not seem sensible.
KPT show that the model can be alternatively specified with a random variable
relating to the motorists’ utility from carrying. In said specification, motorists never
randomize. But since the random variable is private information, the police cannot
condition their search decision on the random utility. This alternative specification
is ‘‘observationally equivalent’’ (KPT, p. 214) to the discussed model. Other critics
question the assumption of strategic criminal decision-making of the entire motorist
population. However, this assumption can be relaxed, making for a more realistic
description. The model prediction does not change if we assume that only a minute
(albeit racially equal) percentage of motorists would actually ponder criminal
engagement by virtue of rational choice (Persico 2002, p. 1484).
Several papers extend and generalize the KPT model. Dharmapala and Ross
(2004) constrain the assumption of perfect visibility of all motorists. In their model
some motorists will always carry contraband, and the police will always want to
search them when spotted. Antonovics and Knight (2004) introduce heterogeneous
utility distributions for both motorists and police officers, an idea further embraced
in Persico and Todd (2006).
Eur J Law Econ (2013) 36:271–294 285
123
Of all the objectionable assumptions in the KPT model, rational choice among
motorists seems the most striking one. The model assumes that all searched
motorists were well aware of the (exact) probability of a successful search when
commuting on the motorway and behave accordingly. How sensible is this
assumption? In a back-of-the-envelope estimation, Close and Mason (2007) guess
that the actual probability of a random motorist in Florida being searched is 3 in 1
million. This greatly qualifies the deterrence effect that policing imposes, especially
given the fact that drivers who abide by the traffic law are highly unlikely to be
stopped in the first place. It is fair to assume that determined criminals will take
heed of any behavior that might raise the search risk. However, without the
strategic reasoning on the part of the motorists, the infra-marginality problem
recurs, rendering inferences based on average outcome data invalid (KPT, p. 212).
The infra-marginality problem could also crop up for other reasons. Anwar and
Fang (2006) (henceforth AF) stress that the KPT model fails if motorist behavior
during a stop is indicative of criminal engagement. AF raise yet another issue. To
date, all models had considered the police force as one homogenous entity. But if
we allow black and white police officers to exhibit racial animus against white and
black motorists, respectively, analyzing the aggregated police force data could lead
to mistaken conclusions. AF propose an alternative model that takes these issues
into account. What is more, their test for prejudice does not require the motorists to
make a rational choice.
3.2 A diverse police: the AF model
Let there be a continuum of police officers and motorists of race rp and
rm 2 B; Wf g, respectively. The police stop and decide whether to search motorists.
A fixed fraction of the motorists is engaged in criminal behavior: prm 2 0; 1ð Þ.3
When stopped, motorists emit a signal h 2 0; 1½ , a one-dimensional index capturing
all relevant characteristics informative of criminal activity. The signal contains
some uncertainty, but the police know that it is distributed according to the
continuous probability density function f rmg ð Þ if the motorist of race rm is engaged in
criminal behavior. If innocent, the index is drawn from f rmn ð Þ. It is not out of the
question that motorists emit even high signals of guilt even though they are actually
not guilty. The likelihood of this happening follows an intuitive formal condition.
The two densities satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property, such that
f rmg hð Þ=f rmn hð Þ is strictly increasing in h. A higher h therefore accurately indicates a
higher guilt probability.
An rp officer bears the marginal search cost t(rm, rp). Note that in contrast to KPT,
this cost depends both on the race of the officer and the motorist. This is also the key
to identify racial prejudice in this model. The benefit of an arrest is one and the cost
of a search is a fraction of the benefit. Without loss of generality, guilty motorists
are always caught.
AF introduce definitions of prejudice and monolithic behavior. The police are
prejudiced if t B; rp
  6¼ t W ; rp
 
. In other words, the police are prejudiced if for any
3 The model can be generalized to incorporate rational choice by the motorists
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given officer race, the search costs depend on the race of the motorist. In contrast,
the police exhibit monolithic behavior if t rm; Bð Þ ¼ t rm; Wð Þ for all rm, that is to say,
if all officer races have the same search costs against a given race of motorists.
Conversely, the police exhibit nonmonolithic behavior if the officer groups have
different search costs against a given race of motorists. It is crucial to differentiate
between prejudice and monolithic behavior. A nonmonolithic police force does not
necessarily indicate the presence of taste-based discrimination. It may be that one
group of officers has higher search costs in general, no matter the race of the
motorists. Likewise, a monolithic police force does not necessarily mean that the
police are unprejudiced. It could be possible that all police groups are equally
prejudiced against a particular motorist group.
Officers maximize their utility by searching at an optimal rate. Let the utility of
not searching be zero. An officer will search a motorist if and only if
Pr G j rm; hð Þ t rm; rp
  ð4Þ
where Pr G j rm; hð Þ indicates the guilt probability of an rm motorist with signal h.
This yields the minimal signal intensity required to make a search worthwhile. A
police officer will only search if the signal is indicative enough of criminal behavior,
so if any only if
h h rm; rp
 
where the threshold h is specified by (4). Intuitively, the threshold value h is
monotonically increasing in search costs: For a search to remain profitable when
search costs are high, an officer will require a large likelihood of criminal activity
(as reflected by a high h). The threshold value h directly determines the equilibrium
search rate c rm; rp
 
and the equilibrium search success rate (or hit rate) S rm; rp
 
.
Given this setup, the rankings of the search rates and the search success rates
follow a systematic pattern that is directly linked to h. Assume that the search costs
against motorist group B are lower than they are against motorist group W. As in
KPT, this implies racial animus against group B. An officer with lower search costs
is thus more likely to search group B because, in contrast to W-motorists, some
otherwise unsuspicious B-motorists now become eligible for search. However,
among the larger number of searched B-motorists, a lower fraction is actually guilty
because relatively more innocent ones are searched. AF make use of this inverse
relationship.
The model gives rise to two testable implications. First, in a monolithic police
force the search costs against a given race of motorists is the same no matter the race
of the officer. Therefore, all officers apply the same search criterion h against that
motorist race such that all search (success) rates against that motorist race are equal.
This constitutes the test for monolithic behavior.
The second testable implication of AF’s model exploits the inverse rank pattern
of the search (success) rates in case of a nonmonolithic police force. In the absence
of racial animus, the rankings of the search and search success rates will not depend
on motorist race. Any empirical differences in search (success) rates are explained
by the fact that the officer groups exhibit distinct search costs.
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To illustrate, let black officers have higher search costs against white motorists
than white officers do. In the absence of prejudice, this implies that the search costs
of black officers against black motorists are the same as they are against white
motorists. Likewise, the search costs of white officers against black motorists are the
same as they are against white motorists. It then follows that the search costs of
black officers against black motorists must also be higher than the search costs of
white officers against black motorists. In other words, black officers have higher
search costs in general which are independent of the race of the motorist. Formally
speaking, the ranking of the search costs by officer race does not depend on the race
of the motorist. Since the search and search success rates are strictly monotone
functions of the search costs, the same independence holds true for the search
(success) rates. Black officers will have lower search rates than white officers
against any motorist race (because the higher search costs imply a higher signal
threshold). On the other hand, black officers will have higher search success rates
than white officers against any motorist race (because among the few searched
motorists, a higher fraction is actually guilty). It takes a lot for black officers to
search. But if they do, they are very successful because they focus on the motorists
with the highest guilt probabilities.
The second testable implication addresses this rank independence. Lower costs
against the discriminated group tend to violate the independent rank order. So the
police are said to be racially prejudiced if the rankings of the search (success) rates
depend on motorist race. It remains unclear, however, which officer race(s) are
actually prejudiced. The test can only assess relative racial prejudice in the police
force because the unbiased rank order is unknown. AF test their model on traffic
data from the Florida Highway Patrol from 2000 to 2001 and cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no racial prejudice.
Like the KPT test, the test proposed in AF belongs to the class of outcome tests.
It assumes that police officers make best use of the observable information (rm, h)
when deciding whether to invest in a search. Equivalently to KPT, taste based
discrimination is modeled via lower search costs. But in contrast to KPT, AF’s test
does not need the assumption of rational choice by the motorists in order to
address the infra-marginality problem. Instead, they circumvent the issue via
ordinal conditions of the search (success) rates. A cardinal comparison of the rates
is not valid. But because of the monotone likelihood ratio property, marginal
changes affect the average outcome in a unique direction. Thus the ordinal
comparison of the rates provides a valid detour around the infra-marginality
problem.
AF’s test shares one drawback with KPT’s. It is unclear whether an unbiased
police force make actual use of race in their guilt assessment. Some
characteristics that give rise to a higher h may simply be more prevalent in
one group. If so, race merely correlates with guilt rates. On the other hand, race
may indeed be beneficial for inferences of guilt. If black motorists have a higher
propensity of crime (prb [ prw ), the police do best to combine this information
with the individual signal h. The following equation highlights this point in AF’s
model:
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Pr G j rm; hð Þ ¼
prm f rmg hð Þ
prm f rmg hð Þ þ ð1  prmÞf rmn hð Þ ð5Þ
The (posterior) probability of guilt given h and observable race is derived via
Bayes’ rule (AF, p. 135). This probability can increase for the two reasons described
above. First, signals indicative of crime might appear with higher probability in one
group. Second, the propensity of crime might be higher in one group. Only in the
latter case do the police use race in their assessment. Like in all models of statistical
discrimination, this is the case when h B; rp
  6¼ h W ; rp
 
, that is to say, when the
police apply different signal thresholds for searching black and white motorists
(despite being unbiased).
Equation (5) mirrors the pivotal insight of models of statistical discrimination:
The assessment about a particular individual with observable signal h depends on
the distribution of that signal in the individual’s group. In both KPT’s and AF’s
tests, however, the researcher can only make inferences about whether the police
have equalized the probabilities of guilt and not the individual suspicion thresholds
(as reflected by the signals) along motorist race. Both modeled outcome tests inherit
this feature from the generic outcome test methodology. Section 2.4 stressed that
outcome tests implicitly assume that the decision-maker exploits statistical
discrimination if it improves the assessment. Hence, because the probabilities of
guilt may or may not include inferences based on race, one cannot be sure whether
race played an instrumental role in the profile. Like generic outcome tests, the
models presented in this section have nothing to say about this.
4 Legal background
4.1 United States
In US courts, statistical evidence is often used in racial profiling litigation. In New
Jersey v. Pedro Soto, for example, a statistical report analyzed the fractions of
minorities among New Jersey Turnpike motorists which had been stopped and
potentially searched between 1988 and 1991 (Lamberth 1994).4 Not surprisingly,
minority motorists were at a much higher risk of being stopped or searched despite a
similar probability of finding engagement in criminal activity. In the report, the null
hypothesis of equal stop or search rates along race was rejected with high statistical
significance. But disparate impact alone does not hold up in US courts.
At first glance, it would seem intuitive that litigation should be based on the
Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution which guards against unreasonable
searches. The current legal approach in racial profiling litigation however is codified
in the so-called McCleskey standard and focuses on the Equal Protection Clause
(EPC), which is part of the Fourteenth Amendment (Persico and Castleman 2005).5
In addition to disparate impact, the EPC requires intent to discriminate for
4 New Jersey v. Pedro Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (1996)
5 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)
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successful litigation. In economic terms, the plaintiff has to prove that the police
exhibited taste-based discrimination in order for jurisprudence to apply strict
scrutiny to the case.
The previous sections have shown that it is not an easy task to infer motives from
outcome data. Disparate impact could also be the result of statistical discrimination,
a goal-oriented policing strategy. And of course, race may also simply correlate with
characteristics indicative of criminal behavior. This latter possibility, however, is
not the relevant distinction in US jurisdiction. Baker and Phillipson (2011) describe
the US approach as follows: ‘‘If a measure distinguishes on the basis of gender or
illegitimacy, it must substantially advance an important state interest, and if it
classifies on the basis of race, national origin, or alienage, it must be narrowly
tailored to a compelling state interest.’’ (p. 111) Disparate impact alone does not
constitute a valid argument. If the state interest—be it prevention of drug trafficking
or terrorist attacks—is compelling and if there are no more efficient ways to pursue
this interest, the measure complies with the Constitution, no matter the degree of
disparate impact. Distinguishing prejudice from efficient policing, then, is the key
element in racial profiling litigation in the US (see Persico 2006 for an extensive
legal review).
The statistical report by Lamberth in New Jersey v. Pedro Soto is not suited to
differentiate between these two motives. The analysis neglects any confounding
variables that influence stop and search decisions. The previous sections have
suggested that an officer’s assessment of a motorist’s likelihood of criminal
engagement can be modeled via a signal that incorporates relevant characteristics
such as the condition of the car, driving behavior, or current location. Once stopped,
other characteristics complete the signal: age, sex, or race of the motorist, conduct,
or clearer cues clues like smell or evidence in visual range. In statistical terms,
Lamberth’s report does not address omitted variable bias.
Newer traffic stop data include some of this omitted information. Close and
Mason (2007) make use of such data and test for racial prejudice with a logistic
regression. They regress enforcement action to motorist and officer characteristics
and circumstantial data such as poverty and crime rates at the stop location. Their
analysis reveals that despite holding these factors constant, race remains a highly
significant predictor for enforcement action. Even so, omitted variable bias remains
an issue. This is where the modeled outcome tests step in.
The models exposited in Sect. 3 are therefore not theoretical gimmicks. They
provide testable implications that are consistent with the current legal approach in
the United States. For instance, Anderson v. Cornejo makes an explicit distinction
between search and search success rates that substantiates the practical application.
According to Judge Easterbrook, disparities in search rates do not establish an
inference of prejudice. Instead, he stresses that equal search success rates ‘‘show
that Custom officials search black women with (on average) the same degree of
suspicion that leads them to search white women or white men.’’6 Note that this
coincides with the interpretation of efficient policing behavior in the modeled
outcome tests. In an unbiased environment, police officers equalize the probabilities
6 Anderson v. Cornejo, 335 F3d 1024-25 (7th Cir 2004)
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of guilt between motorist races. The fact that some groups suffer from disparate
impact is not relevant to the legal discussion in the United States.
4.2 Europe
Things look different in Europe. Racial profiling litigation has no pronounced
history in European courts, and the topic has only recently begun to stir up public
controversy. Accordingly, the legal literature is scarce (see Baker (2007) for an
exception), and economic literature has not yet shown how the existing method-
ology pertains to Europe.
Some differences in the basic legal building blocks are evident, however. US and
European law as defined by Article 14 in the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR) differ in one dimension which qualifies the existing economic
contribution to the legal discourse on racial profiling. While racial prejudice would
equally hold up in court, European jurisdiction also takes issue with disparate
impact. As laid out in Baker (2007) and Baker and Phillipson (2011), a plaintiff
arguing on basis of the ECHR as applied, say, under the UK Human Rights Act,
does not need proof of intent to discriminate for litigation. It suffices to show
disparate impact. There is not even need to present evidence that the state measure
in question employed statistical, let alone taste-based discrimination.
Litigation under the ECHR would, however, take into account the degree of
disparate impact when evaluating the policing measure. This degree of negative
impact is juxtaposed with the legitimate state interest the responsible measure
pursues. In contrast to the US, the jurisprudence is therefore not absolute but rather a
balancing act of state interest and cost to society. There can only be justification for
disparate impact if so-called proportionality allows for it, that is to say, if the state
interest outweighs the disparate impact. In this cost/benefit analysis, motive plays a
crucial role for it affects whether the disparate impact is considered justified (Baker
and Phillipson 2011, pp. 112–113).
It goes without saying that malevolent motives violate Article 14 of the ECHR.
To this extent, the modeled outcome tests in this paper are of use for racial profiling
litigation under the ECHR. But the evaluation of proportionality becomes more
intricate when non-malignant motives are of interest. It is plausible that measures
which overtly encourage the use of statistical discrimination receive higher scrutiny
than measures that focus on characteristics that correlate with ethnicity. In the first
case, suspects with the same individual signals are treated differently because of
their ethnicity. In the second case, suspects with the same individual signals are
treated equally. While this distinction is irrelevant in US litigation, it is crucial for
Europe.
This paper has laid out why the existing modeled outcome tests cannot
disentangle these two distinct causes. Recall that unbiased officers equalize the
probabilities of suspicion along ethnicity. Equation (5) implies that these
probabilities rely on group information if and only if it improves the statistical
assessment. So if group information turns out to be an informative trait, the models
implicitly assume that this information is taken into account. But they cannot assess
the actual occurrence of such statistical discrimination, i.e. whether suspects would
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have been treated differently if their ethnicity had not been observable, precisely the
central question for proportionality in racial profiling litigation under the ECHR.
5 Conclusion
Racial profiling litigation in the US and in Europe relies on the identification of
motives causing disparate impact. In the US, where disparate impact alone does not
build a successful case, the current legal approach requires evidence of racial
prejudice. On the other hand, US law has no issues with considerations of race or
gender for instrumental profiling purposes, even if this entails disparate impact.
Incidentally, this distinction corresponds to the economic notions of taste-based and
statistical discrimination. Recently, these notions have been incorporated in
modeled outcome tests, which lend themselves to making this particular distinction,
a distinction that is pertinent to US discrimination law.
The legal approach in Europe, however, takes issue with disparate impact itself.
This inequality can only be justified in light of a compelling state interest. More
precisely, disparate impact must be evaluated with respect to motive. While racial
prejudice is unambiguously shunned, statistical discrimination gives rise to higher
scrutiny than mere correlation of race with characteristics indicative of criminal
engagement. This paper lays out why (modeled) outcome tests are not able to make
the latter distinction between what can be described as color-indifferent and color-
blind. To this extent, the tests are of limited use in European jurisdiction.
In theory, there is a simple way to establish whether the police were actually color-
blind in a given situation. If outcomes do not change when, ceteris paribus, ethnicity
becomes invisible, ethnicity held no relevant information and was ignored in the
assessment. Any disparate impact is then necessarily by correlation. Likewise, if
outcomes do change when ethnicity becomes invisible, the police were considering it
as a factor in their decision-making. Whether the consideration in the visible case was
taste-based or statistical can be deduced by (modeled) outcome tests.
Unfortunately, this approach seems rarely viable in practice. In most settings, it is
not obvious how one would exclusively render ethnicity invisible, holding
everything else constant. Such experiments are generally only practical if the
emitted signals of interest are not immediately tied to the body, for example in
orchestra auditions behind a veil or in audit studies like written job applications.
One notable exception with non-experimental data such as motor vehicle searches is
presented in a study by Grogger and Ridgeway (2006). The authors exploit natural
changes in daylight that affect an officer’s decision to stop a motorist and argue that
race is not equally well visible at day and at night. Consequently, any according
variation in stopping behavior should be attributable to race. Their results show that
the fraction of black motorists stopped by the police hardly varies with time of day.
This suggests that in their data, race plays no role when making a stop decision.
Disentangling statistical discrimination from correlation is not only of interest for
European racial profiling litigation. It also informs policy design that aims to
prevent disparate impact. In motor vehicle searches, for instance, Persico (2002)
shows that enforcing fairness in form of equalizing search rates does not necessarily
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clash with economic efficiency (defined by minimizing the aggregate crime rate).7
But any remedial policy should take into account that increasing fairness, say, by
forcing the police to ignore race will be mostly ineffective if the main cause of
disparate impact is correlation rather than statistical discrimination.
All the same, prohibiting the use of statistical discrimination inevitably comes at
a price. Outcome tests require unrestricted use of statistical discrimination if it
improves the assessment. The very introduction of remedial measures that restrict
its use would therefore inhibit inferences of racial prejudice based on outcome tests.
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